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care. The author calls this framework the principlist paradigm and maintains that it blinds clinicians from
seeing the full set of moral obligations they have to the patient and limits the range of options they see as
available to navigate through ethical conflicts. Although it is important for the moral obligations it does
recognize (e.g., those based on the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice), the
principlist paradigm should not be used as the only moral template for case analysis. The author illustrates the
paradigm’s limitations with a clinical case study, in which the treating clinicians failed to recognize three
important moral obligations to the patient: the obligation to express regret, the obligation to apologize, and
the obligation to make amends. The failure to recognize these widely accepted moral obligations can have
tragic consequences. The principlist paradigm undertrains clinicians for the complex ethical dilemmas they
face in practice, and medical ethics educators need to rethink the tools they offer student clinicians to guide
their ethical analysis. The author advocates a reexamination of this standard approach to teaching clinical
ethics.
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The Principlist Paradigm and the Problem of the False Negative: 
Why the Clinical Ethics We Teach Fails Patients 
 
 
Introduction 
 The predominant paradigm used to teach clinical ethics in both undergraduate and 
graduate medical education is "principlist" in approach, based on the theory of 
principlism set out by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress.
1
 But unlike the original 
theory, the “Principlist Paradigm” that is taught to medical students, and then used by 
clinicians to resolve clinical ethics dilemmas at the bedside, functions in a way that 
undermines a nuanced assessment of clinical ethics cases.  The Principlist Paradigm 
operates like a short, over-simplified diagnostic check-list that scans for a handful of 
ethical considerations in clinical encounters and then makes its normative assessment 
based entirely on that reductive set of ethical concerns.  
If the check-list were exhaustive of all of the moral considerations that arise in a 
clinical situation, then this mode of moral diagnosis would not be cause for concern. But 
the Principlist Paradigm detects only a limited range of moral considerations, and the 
frequent result is a "false negative," in which the clinical situation appears to have no 
outstanding moral issues--and no moral obligations that would correspond to them--when 
in fact others remain. The effect of the Principlist Paradigm is a narrowing of the moral 
lens through which clinical ethics cases are viewed at the cost of missing important moral 
issues and the moral obligations they generate.  The Principlist Paradigm under-trains 
clinicians for the difficult ethical dilemmas they face in practice. 
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 To illustrate this problem, I examine a clinical ethics case through the lens of the 
Principlist Paradigm. While I acknowledge that the Principlist Paradigm is valuable for 
the moral issues and obligations it does detect, I argue that it should not be used as the 
sole template for case analysis given what it misses; clinical ethics consultations that 
singularly employ the Principlist Paradigm may be doing more harm than good.  How 
widespread the use of the Principlist Paradigm is in clinical ethics is an empirical 
question, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it is common enough that biomedical 
ethics needs to rethink the tools it offers medical students and clinicians to guide their 
ethical analysis and begin to provide an array of ethical heuristics that can expand the 
moral lens through which tough clinical ethics cases are viewed.  
 
The Principlist Paradigm Examined 
 What I am calling the “Principlist Paradigm” is an out-growth of the moral theory 
of principlism laid out in Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 
Like the theory, the Principlist Paradigm begins with four principles--autonomy, 
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice--but its way of using them differs markedly 
from the way the theoretical system is designed to work.  From these four principles, the 
Principlist Paradigm used in clinical ethics distills a fixed set of moral considerations 
which are used to analyze the salient features of a particular ethics case, determine the 
obligations that arise in it, and make the decisions with regard to it. The principle of 
autonomy, for example, is cashed out as (and limited in scope to): a respect for the 
medical decisions competent patients make, the requirement of securing informed 
consent for treatment or waiver of treatment, a recognition of the patient’s need for 
bodily and informational privacy, and the patient’s right to disclosure in medical 
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diagnosis and prognosis.  In a similarly reductionistic way, the principle of beneficence is 
translated into a concern for public health or the safety or health of others connected with 
the case, an interest in securing legitimate substituted judgment in the case of patient 
incompetence, and a resistance to paternalism.  The principle of nonmaleficence becomes 
a concern about participating in active euthanasia or PAS, a caution with regard to 
prescribing treatment modalities that hasten death, a concern for physician impairment or 
misconduct, and worries about medical error. And the principle of justice becomes a 
concern about micro-allocation of scarce resources, such as fair and equitable local 
transplant listings or continuation of futile treatment. Equiped with this list of ethically 
salient issues, the case is analyzed and decided. 
 None of this is bad as far as it goes. It isn’t that the Principlist Paradigm fails to 
pick up legitimate moral concerns—the issues it detects are of critical importance in 
medicine and arguably brought to common moral consciousness through this very 
paradigm. What's wrong with the Principlist Paradigm is what gets left out and why, and 
it is what differentiates the Principlist Paradigm from the theory of principlism.  The 
Principlist Paradigm is an approach to clinical ethics that recognizes a limited and fixed 
set of salient moral considerations that are grounded by the four principles, and then 
searches for these specific elements (and no others) in any particular clinical ethics case.  
Principlism, as a theory rather than a method, is not structurally limited in this way: it 
begins with the four general principles, but its argument is that any moral consideration 
that might be relevant in a concrete case can be subsumed under one of these four 
principles that anchor its objectivity; it sets out categories, but doesn't predetermine what 
will fill those categories.
2  
An analogy oversimplifies a bit, but the Principlist Paradigm 
functions like a metal detector, whereas principlism is more like a kind of moral 
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archaeology.  In an “archaeological” approach to ethics, there are broad categories of 
things one might find, but the search is open-ended and the objects to be found limited 
only by where one is looking.  But a metal detector can only find a specific class of 
objects–no matter how many other objects exist and no matter how well or in what 
location it's used. The argument here is that the normative lens used most often in clinical 
ethics settings functions like a metal detector: the Principlist Paradigm is a tool that can 
only flag certain types of issues and considerations as morally salient in a case, and it 
leaves many others undetected. 
 This comparison explains why a defense of principlism is unlikely to constitute a 
defense of the Principlist Paradigm. Against the charge that the Principlist Paradigm 
narrows the moral lens of clinical ethics, missing important obligations and moral 
considerations, a proponent of principlism might reply that any and all moral obligations 
that exist will fall under the rubric of one of the four principles; there is no normative 
consideration that will fall outside of one of these four broad categories. But if the 
Principlist Paradigm functions the way I claim it does, then this defense will miss the 
mark because it looks at the problem from the wrong direction. It may be the case that 
any moral consideration one could detect in a clinical ethics case could be legitimately 
understood as falling under one of the four principles, but this is a very different claim 
from arguing that, armed with a limited list of what to look for, all of the moral 
considerations that exist in the case will be detected.  This defense of principlism is a 
claim about the theory’s ability to incorporate new understandings of moral obligation 
into the original schema; it is not an argument that the current schema cashed out as the 
Principlist Paradigm will enable us to uncover or perceive all of the moral obligations or 
considerations that exist.
3
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 A more fruitful avenue for undercutting this critique of the Principlist Paradigm is 
to deny that it is in widespread use in clinical ethics. Many professional clinical ethicists 
will justifiably claim that their approach to ethics consultation is much more expansive 
and nuanced than I will describe. But in reflecting on the question of how often the 
Principlist Paradigm is actually employed, we need to remember that, by far, most of the 
ethical problems that arise in clinical medicine are resolved by the treating clinicians 
involved in a patient’s medical care, and these individuals are not by and large “clinical 
ethicists.” Only a small subset of the ethical dilemmas that occur in hospital-based 
medicine are brought to the attention of the clinical ethicist or ethics consult service of 
the institution. So one way of getting at this question is to think about how clinical ethics 
is or has been taught to the medical students and residents who will be making most of 
the ethics judgments and decisions at the bedside.  Surely there are alternatives to the 
Principlist Paradigm, but we don’t see “theory” converted into “mantra” when just a 
handful of people use it.  And it shouldn't be surprising that it has had a high level of 
appeal: it is systematic and formulaic, so--parallel to other clinical diagnostic tools--it 
makes ethical analysis efficient and, on the face of it, accurate. 
 Its accuracy is, of course, what is at issue in this argument, so to illustrate the 
problems that occur with use of the Principlist Paradigm, I turn to the analysis of a 
difficult clinical ethics case. 
 
The Principlist Paradigm in Practice 
 Consider the following case, which I will claim is representative of a class of 
cases that is ethically serious and complex, but unlikely to come before an ethics consult 
service: 
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A 30-year-old man was admitted from the ED to the MICU for upper GI bleeding. 
Stat endoscopy revealed a large posterior duodenal ulcer as the likely source. 
Although he wasn’t actively bleeding at the time of the endoscopy, he started to 
rebleed during the night. The patient agreed to get blood transfusions and signed 
the hospital’s consent form. He received two units of packed red cells, which 
raised his hemoglobin 2 gm/dL.  He had only two peripheral catheters (22 and 20 
gauge) for IV access.  Despite multiple attempts, the MICU house staff couldn’t 
place a larger IV angiocath peripherally. The resident explained to the patient the 
need for a central venous catheter, its risks and benefits.  The patient was upset at 
the failed attempts to place the large peripheral IV and lacked confidence in the 
house staff to place the central line. He refused to give consent for the central 
venous catheter. Later that night, the patient’s blood pressure suddenly dropped.  
He rapidly lost consciousness and then his rhythm.  Despite the ICU resident 
placing a femoral catheter stat, he could not be resuscitated due to the ongoing 
large GI hemorrhage. 
 
If we back up in time to the point at which this patient refused to consent to the central 
line, what would an ethical analysis of this situation look like using the template of the 
Principlist Paradigm?  What would the clinical team “see” as, first, the relevant moral 
issues in this case and, second, the ensuing ethical obligations that follow from them? 
Here is the way in which this case would be “diagnosed” by the clinical team at 
the bedside: two principles would be brought to bear on the analysis, the principle of 
autonomy and the principle of beneficence, and a handful of limited options would 
follow.  Protecting the patient’s autonomy would be cashed out as either securing the 
patient’s consent or respecting the patient’s refusal, and this would mean making sure 
that the patient clearly comprehended the seriousness of his condition and the risks he 
was assuming in not complying.  It would also require consideration of the patient’s 
ability to comprehend the situation and rationally assess the risks of foregoing the central 
line; in other words, the patient’s competence to make this critical decision would need to 
be assessed.  The team would first try to convince the patient of the necessity of placing 
the central line.  They would likely employ different members of the team, using different 
strategies and tactics.  When that failed, and the patient continued to refuse the central 
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line, the team would begin to question the patient’s competence to make the decision.  
Then the team would focus on the principle of beneficence and try to have the patient 
officially deemed incompetent so that they could act paternalistically in the patient’s best 
interests and secure the line.  This second option would require a consultation with the 
on-call psychiatry team. 
In the case we have been analyzing, the patient does not receive the central line, 
so the events likely unfold in the following way.  The team, having had no success in 
securing the patient’s consent, calls for a psych consult, since they believe it is clearly 
irrational for the patient to refuse the team’s recommendations in the face of being at high 
risk for rebleeding.  When the psychiatrist comes, she finds the patient lucid and rational, 
and he is deemed competent to make this decision.  The treating team’s only recourse at 
this point is -- returning to the principle of autonomy -- to try again to get consent.  They 
try repeatedly to explain to the patient the absolute necessity of inserting a central line, 
but the patient is adamant in his refusal.  
At this point, the clinical team would view their hands as tied.  Operating inside 
the Principlist Paradigm, they would have recognized two relevant moral principles in the 
case and the handful of options that follow from them; and, after exhausting these limited 
options, they would have been frustrated and sad, but also confident that they had 
discharged all of the moral obligations binding on them in this case.  When the patient 
dies due to his own bad choice, they would view this as a tragedy, but they would see no 
moral culpability on their part: having done all they could, they are clinically and morally 
blameless. 
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Expanding the Moral Lens: Four Obligations the Principlist Paradigm Does Not 
Detect 
 
 To see why the Principlist Paradigm might have failed to detect all of the salient 
moral features in this case -- and the obligations that attach to them -- let’s attempt to 
reconstruct the case from the patient’s perspective.  The status of this account will be 
speculative, of course, because it is not literally the patient’s own narrative; on the other 
hand, we stand a better chance of capturing the psychological motivations that drove his 
refusal through a fictional account than the patient would have likely had were he to have 
tried to voice his own account that night.  Laying hold of one’s own psychological 
dispositions is no mean feat, especially when confronted with a serious, acute health 
crisis.  The test we’ll use of this being a credible projection into the patient’s experience 
is that it both resonates with how we might feel in that situation and offers a plausible 
explanation of the course of action he chose.  Let’s assume the patient’s story has these 
elements in it:  
From the very beginning, his experience in this hospital has been horrible, from 
the long wait in the ER, to the barrage of invasive tests, to the admission to the 
ICU. He has been passed from doctor to doctor, and no one seems to know what 
they’re doing or be in charge. He feels like he is being used as a “guinea pig” for 
the training of new doctors.  He feels indignation and resentment at the failed 
attempts to insert the larger catheters – if they had given him a real doctor, and 
these amateurs, this wouldn’t have happened.  The repeated, failed attempts by 
the house staff have made him lose all confidence in the team and undermined his 
trust in the treating resident. He feels powerless and helpless; he feels out of 
control.  This shouldn’t be happening to someone 30 years old.  He feels betrayed 
by his own young body.  He is very scared. 
 
Does any part of this story add additional moral considerations to the ones we have 
already detected through the Principlist Paradigm; and, if so, do these other salient 
considerations generate obligations to the patient beyond the two already discharged? 
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 To make the case that the clinical staff viewed this situation through too narrow a 
lens, I want to take a step back and lay out theoretically several common circumstances 
under which we universally recognize moral obligations to others.  I take these several 
circumstances to be part of commonsense morality.  We have a moral obligation to 
others: 1) when the recognition of someone’s suffering is needed to acknowledge her 
standing as a person; 2) when we have wronged someone in some way; and, 3) when we 
have promised someone something.   
Let’s look at the first circumstance in more detail because it requires some 
explanation to make more obvious.  When another person has experienced some type of 
emotional or physical pain, and I have a relationship with that individual, then I am 
obligated to convey that I recognize that pain and am sorry it has occurred.  If I fail to do 
this, I have – by act or omission – dismissed the suffering of another person.  To dismiss 
the pain of another person is to negate that individual’s value as a person; it is to deny 
that the person matters and “is to be valued.”  This is the theoretical explanation for the 
commonsense desire to have our feelings validated.  Take an everyday example.  If 
someone I have a relationship with has experienced a death in her family, I have a moral 
obligation to express condolence.  If I don’t, I have in effect declared that what has 
happened to her is of no significance or import.  By ignoring her emotional pain, I am 
saying: “It doesn’t matter.”  But to be valued as a person is to have our concerns valued 
and validated. It isn’t etiquette or mere convention that prompts my response, and it isn’t 
optional: I owe her my condolences, and I fail to acknowledge her value as a person if I 
don’t give them.    
If we return now to the case, assuming that our story from the patient’s 
perspective is plausible, it is not difficult to see that all three of the conditions that 
 10 
generate additional moral obligations exist in this case.  Consider the first condition: (1) 
when the recognition of someone’s suffering is needed to acknowledge her standing as a 
person.  This patient is clearly suffering – not merely in the way that all patients suffer 
(i.e., through the physical condition that makes them “patients” in the first place), but 
additionally because he has had to endure multiple attempts at a procedure that has 
repeatedly failed and because his rapid physical deterioration, and the difficulty the house 
staff has had in treating him, has made him feel terrified, used, powerless, and out of 
control.  If this pain, both physical and emotional, is not recognized and validated, the 
individual will feel dismissed, undervalued, insignificant, and demoralized.  If someone 
can easily prevent those feelings of disvalue in another person, then he is under moral 
obligation to do so.  The circumstance of someone “needing recognition of pain to have 
one’s value affirmed” generates a critical – not optional – moral obligation: the 
Obligation to Express Regret.  Even if we assume that the treating resident’s skill set is 
unrelated to the failed attempts to place the larger catheter (e.g., the man has small veins, 
no one could have done better), the resident still has an obligation to express regret in a 
form that conveys the sentiment: I recognize your suffering; It matters to me; You matter 
to me; I wish this hadn’t happened to you. Because the patient has no other support 
people with him in this crisis (he has come to the ER, and now ICU, alone), the only 
individuals present with whom he has a relationship are the members of the treating team, 
and they must assume this role.  The expressions of regret that have conventionally 
conveyed this significance or “mattering” of another person in a situation of suffering are 
very simple; they require almost no time and very little effort: one simply says (and really 
means), “I’m sorry that this has been so difficult.  It’s awful to be stuck so many times.”   
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The expression of regret that I have argued is obligatory seems so simple that it 
can appear to be trivial and unnecessary.  To challenge the claim that it is morally 
optional, imagine how the patient feels whose gynecologist tells her she has had a 
miscarriage of a long-awaited pregnancy, but does not add a sincere: “I am so sorry.”  
Nor is the expression of regret related to clinical culpability or responsibility.  The 
gynecologist did not cause the miscarriage; it is not because the physician played any role 
in the pregnancy’s outcome that the expression of regret is required.  The physician says 
she is sorry to acknowledge the sadness, loss, and grief of her patient and to convey that 
this patient matters to her.  The situation with our ICU case is no different morally.  We 
have culturally come to recognize the emotional suffering caused by a miscarriage, and 
so “miscarriage” has been placed in the category of “suffering that must be recognized;” 
but surely the feelings of fear, indignation, resentment, and anxiety also place one’s 
experience in the category of “suffering that must be recognized.”  If a physician is under 
moral obligation to express regret for a miscarriage, I argue she is also under moral 
obligation to express regret for the kind of situation this patient finds himself in.  In 
summary, when the recognition of someone’s suffering is needed to acknowledge the 
patient’s standing as a person, there exists an obligation to express regret.   
A second condition under which we have a moral obligation to another person is 
(2) when we have wronged someone.  This is the most uncontroversial circumstance of 
the three, as are the two commonsense moral obligations that follow from this 
circumstance: the Obligation to Apologize and the Obligation to Make Amends.  
Returning to our case, let’s now assume that the resident’s skill level explains the failed 
attempts to place the larger catheter (e.g., with a more experienced clinician this wouldn’t 
have happened).  If the successful placement of a larger catheter in this particular patient 
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would have been likely had the physician been more experienced, then an apology is 
required.  The type of ‘wronging” that exists in this case doesn’t rise to the level of 
medical error or negligence; nevertheless, if the skill set of the treating physician does not 
yet match the difficulty of the task, and this leads to the unnecessary suffering of the 
patient, this is a kind of wronging or harm.  The Obligation to Apologize in this case 
comes from the unintentional harm done to the patient by a physician who is still 
completing her training.  Medical culture has long resisted the practice of apologizing for 
a myriad of reasons, not all of which involve fear of malpractice litigation, but that 
resistance puts the field of medicine out of step with everyday morality and thwarts the 
moral expectations we hold for each other.  Mirroring everyday moral life, the first 
obligation in response to causing harm is an apology: “I am sorry I couldn’t get this 
placed.  I feel terrible about sticking you so many times.”   
To the claim that a harm of this type demands an apology, one might argue that 
the harm is too small to warrant this obligation: the so-called “harm” here involves 
nothing more than a few extra needle sticks; the level of pain involved is a pinch.  The 
first response to this objection is that the patient is unlikely to see it that way (in fact, it is 
the patient’s distress over these failed IV attempts that prompts him to refuse the central 
line); but a less case-specific response is that far lesser harms than unnecessary needle 
sticks trigger the obligation to apologize in this culture and the judgment about the level 
and degree of bodily invasion or pain that counts as “harm” is a cultural matter.  If I am 
obligated to apologize when I accidentally, but lightly, step on a stranger’s foot, then I am 
surely obligated to apologize if I stick him with a needle more times than is necessary 
because of my inadequate level of skill.  
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 But as a response to harming someone, an apology is usually not enough.  A 
second obligation is required -- wherever possible -- in response to causing harm, namely 
the Obligation to Make Amends.  The moral demand to “set things right” is again merely 
a part of everyday moral practice: if the harm can be reversed, or compensated, or 
avoided in the future, we are under obligation to take those steps.  In this case, the action 
for making amends is obvious: find a clinician whose skill set is commensurate with the 
required task, and assure the patient that you will call in someone with more expertise to 
take over.  In summary, when we have wronged someone, we have the dual obligation to 
apologize and make amends. 
 The final circumstance I want to consider that generates moral obligations to 
others is 3) when we have made someone a promise.  The patient-physician relationship 
is a type of covenant or promise: the physician promises to treat the patient and commits 
to non-abandonment.  The patient’s trust and confidence in the physician is the 
foundation of that relationship; therefore, one of the moral obligations that follows from 
the covenant made in establishing the doctor-patient relationship is the Obligation to 
Secure the Patient’s Trust and Confidence.  When that trust has been undermined, for 
whatever reason, the physician needs to regain it or transfer care as part of the promise 
made in establishing that relationship.  In the ideal case, the relationship can be repaired, 
and an attempt at repair is the obvious first step; but if that proves impossible, the 
clinician needs to facilitate the establishment of a new relationship.  In the case we have 
been analyzing, the patient had clearly lost trust and confidence in the treating physician.  
At the point at which the patient expressed doubt and mistrust, the resident had a moral 
obligation to attempt to re-establish trust and confidence, one way or another.  How 
would that conversation have looked, for example?  The resident could have restated her 
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commitment to their common goal -- the patient’s health, his getting well; she could have 
requested his help in reaching that goal by asking what he needed from her or the team to 
set things right; and she could have offered him someone else’s expertise, if his 
confidence in hers couldn’t be regained.  She might have said something as simple as, 
“You and I both want you to get well.  Let me help you or let me find someone else who 
can. I will find the best person here to put in this central line.  Please allow us to help 
you.  Don’t let us fail you.”   
 Too often in cases in which the patient resists or refuses the clinical team’s 
recommendations, the treating clinicians assume the role of the Aesopian wind trying to 
blow off the man’s coat: desperately trying to save this patient’s life, the team tries to 
cajole, coax, and convince the patient to consent to the life-saving treatment plan.  While 
the confrontational approach to secure consent is well-intentioned, it usually fails because 
it doesn’t recognize what’s driving the patient’s resistance or refusal.  In this case, the 
patient doesn’t want to die; he consented to being admitted to the MICU because he 
wants to get well.  So what is motivating his refusal to have the central line placed?  He 
consented to all of the other procedures and tests over the course of the night, so why not 
this one?  He is refusing now because he no longer believes he is being treated by a 
competent team of clinicians; the failure to place the peripheral lines has undermined his 
confidence.  If I have lost my trust in what you say or my confidence in your abilities, I 
cannot be convinced that it is a prudent course of action.  And in the absence of trust, the 
direct approach is likely to be perceived as coercive and suspect, adding to the patient’s 
impression that he is not in good hands.  Securing consent requires trust. Having 
established a doctor-patient relationship with this patient, the treating physician has an 
obligation to regain his trust and confidence or find him another clinician.   
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The Failure of the Principlist Paradigm: The Problem of the False Negative 
 
The Principlist Paradigm detects two moral obligations in our case, both of which 
the resident discharged by her actions: the obligation to respect autonomy, by either 
securing consent or respecting the refusal; and, the obligation to act beneficently, by 
ensuring that the patient is competence, and if not, by overriding the patient’s decision to 
achieve the patient’s own best interests.  Looking through the lens of the Principlist 
Paradigm, there were no other moral obligations binding in this case.  In contrast, I have 
argued that this case generates four additional moral obligations that must be discharged 
by the treating team: the obligation to express regret; the obligation to apologize; the 
obligation to make amends; and the obligation to secure the patient’s trust and 
confidence.  If any of these four obligations do apply in this tragic case, then the 
Principlist Paradigm failed to detect all of the moral obligations of the treating team.  
Because the Principlist Paradigm offers us a limited moral lens through which to 
view clinical ethics cases, it cannot detect ethical obligations outside of the scope of the 
moral rules that have conventionally been attached to the four principles.  The Principlist 
Paradigm is valuable as a method of moral analysis as far as it goes: it detects important 
moral obligations that have been critical in improving the delivery of healthcare.  But the 
Principlist Paradigm also gives us a false reassurance that we have fulfilled all of the 
duties to patients when this limited set of obligations has been met, though, in fact, other 
obligations have not been met.  At the conclusion of a case analysis, the Principlist 
Paradigm tells us we have no obligations where we actually do. The problem with the 
Principlist Paradigm is that it can generate an ethical “false negative” that actually 
compromises excellent patient care.  
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Ethics at the bedside has unequivocally embraces the Principlist Paradigm as the 
ideal mode of ethical decision-making, and it is the dominant mode of ethical analysis 
taught to student clinicians.  While important for the moral obligations it does recognize, 
the Principlist Paradigm should not be used as the only moral template for case analysis.  
Medical ethics education needs to rethink the tools it offers students and clinicians to 
guide their ethical analysis so that we can expand the moral lens through which we assess 
the relevant obligations in tough clinical ethics cases.   
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1
T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, The Principles of Biomedical Ethics.  For a discussion 
of the difference between the theory of principlism and the Principlist Paradigm, see 
below. 
2
 That is why the content of four principles is still an open debate. of course, principlism 
sets out a range of moral considerations that fit under any particular principles -- that's 
where the Principlist Paradigm got the list.  The question is whether principlism has 
limited its own vision so that what's on that list is all that can be seen, or whether the list 
is tentative and the search on going for other important moral considerations that fall 
under the general principles.  A full treatment of principlism is beyond the scope of this 
paper, and one question that remains is whether the Principlist Paradigm is a natural 
offshoot of principlism, in other words, whether principlism creates this paradigm. 
whether it succeeds or not is an open question. 
3
 Of course this sounds like a criticism of principlism, not just a criticism of the 
Principlist Paradigm – because I imply that the current schema -- here and all of them -- 
is an adequate to the task of detect in all of the moral considerations either.  That would 
be a criticism of principlism if that were its intention, namely, to detect any and all moral 
considerations in obligations that exist.  But that would be a strange goal for theory.  My 
understanding of principlism is that its intention is to demonstrate and objectivity in the 
core principles that govern biomedical life, not to be able to generate an exhaustive list of 
everything that is subsumed under those principles.  Why would generators of such a 
theory one that?  Beauchamp Childress would be the last people to argue against moral 
development at our argue in favor of a static conception of ethics. 
